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GERMAN REUNIFICATION-THE PRIVATIZATION OF
SOCIALIST PROPERTY ON EAST GERMANY'S PATH TO
DEMOCRACY*
I. HISTORY
After Germany's defeat in World War II, it was divided into
two countries: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), commonly
known as West Germany, and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), commonly known as East Germany. The FRG adopted a
social market economy' which included the right to own private
property2 in its Basic Law (Grundgesetz).3 The GDR developed a
centrally planned socialist economy, 4 modeled after that of the
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr. Klaus Brammen for the
use of his library and his assistance on this piece.
I P. KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 86-87 (1987). The
concept of the social market economy expresses the belief that market competition
and social protection are not antagonistic to each other, rather, they are mutually
reinforcing. The growth dividends of a dynamic market economy were thought to
be sufficient to alleviate class conflict and encourage a convergence of interests
between business and labor. Individual liberty in economic life was considered the
best guarantor of political liberty. d. Ludwig Erhard was primarily responsible for
instituting the social market economy in the FRG. Fuhrman, Ludwig Erhard, where
are you?, FORBES, Aug. 6, 1990, at 41.
2 Article 14 of the Grundgesetz specifically states:
(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and
limits shall be determined by the laws.
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be
effected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature
and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined
by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the
interests of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of
compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14 (W. Ger.).
3 Since the entire German nation, as the true holder of sovereignty, was not
able to frame a common constitution for the state in 1949, the Germans in the
western zones could only act provisionally. As a result, the Basic Law of the FRG
is not the constitution of the whole nation, but is under the reservation that such
a constitution will be adopted by a free decision of the German people. Klein, The
Concept of the Basic Law, in MAIN PRINCIPLES OF =I GERMAN BASIC LAW 25-26
(C. Starck ed. 1983).
4 The East German Constitution describes its economy as:
based on the socialist ownership of the means of production. By depriving
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Soviet Union,' which significantly curtailed the right to own private
property.6 Nationally-owned property of society as a whole, known
as "people's property" (Volkseigentum), 7 became the predominant
form of property for enterprises in the GDR.8
The people's enterprises were treated as economic units in an
overarching economic system in which the government, as proprietor,
dictated the management, planning, and financing of the enterprises.9
Neither people's enterprises nor people's real property could be util-
ized as security to obtain a lien, mortgage, or loan. 0 People's property
was also exempt from attachment and protected from third party
claims." A usage right was the greatest interest in people's property
that an individual could possess. 2 If the right were not exercised in
harmony with the material and cultural requirements of GDR society,
the monopolies and big landowners of their power, by abolishing the
capitalist profit economy, the source of war policy and the exploitation of
man by man was abolished. The socialist relations of production emerged
as a result of the struggle for the abolition of the monopol[istic] capitalistic
economic system which has brought only distress to the German nation by
its aggressive and adventurist policy. Socialist ownership has stood the test.
Dim VERFASSUNo DER DDR [VERs] art. 9 (E. Ger.).
H. LEwis, NEW CONSTrruTIONS IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 37 (1948) [hereinafter
LEWIS].
6 VERF art. 11 (E. Ger.). Article 11 of the GDR Constitution states in part:
"The use of personal property may not be contrary to the interests of society."
See Turner, Der Eigentumsbegriff DDR, 1990, NEuE JumisTiSCnn WocHENscHRanr,
555, 556 [hereinafter Turner, Eigentumsbegrifj].
Volkseigentum was property officially owned by the "people," but was actually
controlled by the East German Communist Party. Article 12 of the GDR Constitution
specifically defines Volkseigentum as:
(1) the mineral wealth, mines, power stations, barrages and large waters,
larger industrial enterprises, nationally-owned farms, the banks and insur-
ance societies, the traffic routes, the means of transport of the railways,
ocean shipping as well as civil aviation, post and telecommunications in-
stallations, are nationally owned property. The private ownership of these
facilities is inadmissible. The state can assign their utilization and admin-
istration to cooperative or social organizations and associations. Such an
assignment must serve the general interests and increase the social wealth.
VERn art. 12 (E. Ger.).
I A. KOHIER & R. STREIcH, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT DER DDR, ix-xiv (1990).
9 Knuepfer, Wandlungen der Eigentumsverhaltnisse durch die neue Wirtschafts-
gesetzgebung in der DDR, 1990 BETRIEBs-BERATER (Beilage 20 zu Heft 15) 1, 2
[hereinafter Knuepfer, Wandlungen].
"0 Turner, Eigentumsbegrff, supra note 6, at 555.
" Blau & Rawert, East Germany: Legal Steps Towards a Market Economy, July/
August 1990 INTERNATIONAL Busnmss LAWYER 305, 306 [hereinafter Blau & Rawert,
East Germany] (explaining ZrviLOESETZBUCH [ZGB] art. 20, para. 3).
12 ZGB art. 286 (E. Ger.).
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or if it were used for a purpose different than that for which it was
granted, the usage right could be taken away.' 3
Between 1945 and 1952, the Soviet Union expropriated enterprises
and real property from GDR citizens who had been affiliated with
the Nazi Party or who fled to the FRG. 4 In the years after 1949
the Soviet Union returned some previously expropriated properties
and enterprises. However, they were not returned to the prior owners;
they were managed as people's property or enterprises." In 1945 the
GDR government enacted land reforms resulting in the seizure of
lands owned by former Nazis and war criminals. All estates over 100
hectacres were expropriated. The socialization of industry gathered
momentum during the 1950's, and by 1965 over 80% of all industry
was socialist property. 16 Another period of socialization took place
in 1972 during which the government seized almost all the remaining
small and middle-sized private enterprises and converted them into
people's enterprises.' 7 By 1988 over 90% of East German enterprises
were people's enterprises. 8
The peaceful revolution that occurred in the GDR during the fall
of 1989 was the first step in the reunification of the FRG and GDR.
The revolution was also the catalyst for the transformation of property
ownership in the GDR from socialist government ownership to a
social market system in which private property predominates.' 9
The first legal step towards a market economy was a constitutional
amendment enacted on January 12, 1990, which repealed the pro-
hibition of private ownership in the means of production contained
13 Forder, Socialist Mountains out of Capitalist Molehills, 8 LEGAL STUDIES 154,
159 (1986). See Turner, Eigentumsbegriff, supra note 6, at 555.
14 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 37-38. The expropriations were accomplished by Order
Number 124, issued by Marshall Zhukov in October 1945. The order prompted the
seizure of 4000 industrial enterprises. Id. at 37.
15 Kaiser, Forward to FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR ALL-GERMAN AFFAIRS, INJUSTICE
THEREGIME 123 (1952).
16 M. DENNIS, GERmAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 129 (1988).
17 Hebing, Das neue Unternehmensrecht der DDR, 1990 BETRIEBS-BERATER, (Bei-
lage 18 zu Heft 1) 1, 6 [hereinafter Hebing, Unternehmensrecht].
"1 Knuepfer, Wandlungen, supra note 9, at 2 (citing STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DER
DEUTScHEN DEMOKRATISC-EN REPUBLIK 1989 at 99). In 1988 the following percentages
of socialist enterprises were people's property: industry = 97.6%, construction
industry = 92%, farming and forestry = 95.90, transportation, postal service and
telecommunications = 98.2%, domestic trade = 91.6%, other production branches
= 94.6%. Id. at 6.
'9 Knuepfer, Wandlungen, supra note 9, at 5.
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in article 12, paragraph one, of the East German Constitution and
allowed for exceptions from the principle of state-owned property.
Simultaneously, a new article 14a was introduced which allowed the
establishment of enterprises with foreign participation by traditional
economic entities as well as by craftsmen, businessmen, and private
citizens.20
On January 25, 1990, the GDR issued the first revolutionary ec-
onomic law, the Regulation Concerning the Establishment and Busi-
ness Activity of Companies with Foreign Participation in the GDR. 21
In March of 1990 the newly elected GDR government announced
that a Trust Institution would be created in order to privatize the
people's enterprises and supervise their transition to capitalism.2 The
process began slowly. Originally, the GDR government enacted re-
gulations designed to facilitate the availability of real property for
business purposes and to address demands for the restitution of
expropriated property. 23 This ad hoc basis of enacting regulations
resulted in gaps in the law and discrepancies in the new regulations.2
The governments of the GDR and FRG signed the Treaty for the
Creation of a Monetary, Economic, and Social Union between the
20 Blau & Rawert, East Germany, supra note 11, at 306.
21 Id. This regulation provided for the establishment of joint ventures between
Western enterprises and East German enterprises in cases where the joint venture
promoted research and development, production, marketing, services, or environ-
mental protection. From the outset, the Ordinance's deficiences limited its effect-
iveness. The East German Economic Committee, which was set up to oversee the
process, retained the power to revoke the joint venture if the GDR shareholder or
the GDR itself became "disadvantaged." The transitional Ordinance's inadequacy
was due to the GDR government's fear of completely "selling out" socialist property
to the West. It was later repealed, but serves as an example of the difficulties
involved in the transformation of the law of a socialist planned economy into a
market oriented legal system. Id. at 307. See The Verordnung fiber die Grindung
und Tatigkeit von Unternehmen mit auslandischer Beteiligung in der DDR BGB1.
I, Nr. 4, S. 16 (E. Ger.) [hereinafter Joint Venture Ordinance].
22 Hebing, Unternehmensrecht, supra note 17, at 4-5 (explaining BGBI. I, Nr.
14, S. 107 Beschlub zur Grindung der Anstalt zur treuhanderischen Verwaltung des
Volkseigentums (Treuhandanstalt) vom 1.3.1990, and explaining BGB1. I, Nr. 18,
S. 167 Statut der Anstalt zur treuhiinderischen Verwaltung des Volkseigentums -
Beschlub des Ministerrates - vom 15. 3. 1990). Note that at this early stage the
Trust Institution's authority did not extend to people's real property, businesses
controlled by cities and municipalities, or to agricultural enterprises. Id. at 5. The
Trust Institution was also empowered to give and loan usage rights in real property,
and to issue securities in the transforming enterprises. Handelsblatt, March 21, 1990,
at 6, col. 1.
23 Hebing, Unternehmensrecht, supra note 17, at 2.
14 Knuepfer, Wandlungen, supra note 9, at 5.
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FRG and GDR (Staatsvertrag) on June 25, 1990.25 The Treaty pro-
vided for German reunification according to the preamble of the
FRG's Basic Law, which requires that the East Germans choose to
join the FRG, 26 and article 23 of the Basic Law, which stipulates
that West German Basic Law replaces the law of the GDR. 27 The
implementation of West German law was further achieved through
the Agreement Treaty of September 28, 1991 ("Agreement Treaty' ").21
The Law for the Privatization and Reorganization of People's Prop-
erty ("Trust Law") (Treuhandgesetz),29 which accompanied the Treaty,
established the Trust Institution to privatize the people's enterprises
and real property during the transformation period. These documents
taken together: the property regulations, the Treaty, the Agreement
Treaty, and the Trust Law establish the legal basis for many Germans
to reclaim their expropriated property and provide for the privati-
zation of people's enterprises and real property. However, the laws
also create legal uncertainties in the sale and reclamation of expro-
priated property and create a special status for enterprises in the
Trust Institution that allows them to keep inaccurate records during
the privatization process.
II. LAW
A. Property Law and Regulations
In the interim phase between East Germany and West Germany's
decision to reunite and the actual political reunification, the two
23 Vertrag iber die Schaffung einer Wahrungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Re-
publik, June 25, 1990, West Germany-East Germany, BUNDESGESTZBLATT [BGB1.]
II, Nr. 20, S. 537 [hereinafter The Treaty].
26 GG preamble (W. Ger.). The preamble states in part: "The German people
... have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied.
The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the
unity and freedom of Germany."
217 Article 23 states:
For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the Lander
of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Sax-
ony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein,
Wuirttemberg-Baden, and Wuirtemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Ger-
many it shall be put into force on their accession.
GG art. 23 (W. Ger.).
28 Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 31. August 1990 zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik uiber die Herstellung der
Einheit Deutschlands - Einigungsgesetz - und der Vereinbarung vom 18. September
1990, West Germany-East Germany, BGBI. II, Nr. 35, S. 885 [hereinafter The
Agreement Treaty].
Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Verm6gens GB1.
I, Nr. 33, S. 300 (E. Ger.) [hereinafter Trust Law].
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countries enacted legislation to assist the privatization of real property
in the GDR. With the GDR's decision to make its enterprises available
to Western investment and joint ventures, the need arose for com-
mercial structures and real property suitable for business purposes.30
The Law for the Sale of People's Structures3' ("Sales Law") was the
first legislation that directly addressed East Germany's need for busi-
ness space. The Sales Law stated that private parties could purchase
East German commercial structures for business purposes. 32 This
regulation was an exception to article 20 of the GDR's Civil Law
Book (Zivilgesetzbuch), which stated that people's property could not
be privately acquired or conveyed if the property was to be used for
business purposes. 33
The FRG and GDR issued the Joint Declaration for the Regulation
of Open Property Questions 34 ("Declaration") on June 15, 1990,
which announced that prior owners of expropriated property can
expect the return of their property under qualified circumstances."
Generally, prior owners or their heirs possess valid claims for the
return of property if their property was expropriated through eco-
nomic coercion by the GDR. 36 Where the expropriated real property
is used for housing projects, business purposes, or new enterprises
however, the government will tender compensation instead of the
expropriated property itself.37 Compensation can consist of money,
a new piece of land of equal value,38 or, in cases where the GDR
30 Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
31 Gesetz iber den Verkauf volkseigener GebAuede vom 7.3, 1990, BGBI. I, Nr.
18, S. 157 (E. Ger.).
32 Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 1 (clarifying article one of the Gesetz
fiber den Verkauf volkseigener Gebaiuede vom 7.3.1990, BGB1. I, Nr. 18, S. 157).
11 ZGB art. 20, abs. 3 (E. Ger.). See also VER art. 12 (E. Ger.). See LEwis,
supra note 5, at 13 (summary of limitations on people's property).
3' Handelsblatt, June 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3 (explaining Die gemeinsame Erklirung
zur Regelung offener Verm6gensfragen, June 15, 1990, West Germany-East Ger-
many).
11 The Joint Declaration was included as part of the Agreement Treaty. The
Agreement Treaty, supra note 28, at art. 41 (1).
36 Handelsblatt, June 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3. Examples of economic coercion
include expropriation due to overindebtedness, property sales forced on GDR im-
migrants when the sale was a condition of the issuance of a departure permit, and
property converted to people's property after GDR owners had fled to other countries.
Gemeinsame Erklarung zur Regelung der offenen Verm6gensfragen, DDR SPEZIAL,
July 13, 1990, at 6, 7 [hereinafter Gemeinsame Erkiarung].
11 Handelsblatt, June 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3 (explaining Gemeinsame Erklarung
item 2a).
38 Gemeinsame Erkidrung, supra note 36, at item 2b.
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expropriated enterprises and converted them into people's property,
the government will return the whole enterprise, shares of the en-
terprise, or provide appropriate compensation.3 9 Where expropriations
occurred in criminal proceedings that were contrary to constitutional
state law, the GDR will create a procedure to provide fair compen-
sation.40 Item 5 of the Declaration states that GDR law continues to
protect rent control and usage rights which touch and concern real
property and buildings .4I In item 13 the GDR agreed to create the
necessary legal and procedural provisions for the claims process and
agreed to create a fund for compensation claims that will be inde-
pendent from the national budget. Furthermore, the GDR will allow
no property sales if the ownership rights are unclear. Prior ownership
conditions must unequivocally prove that the property was never
expropriated, and the prior owners must affirm that they have no
claim against the property. 42
The Declaration provides an exception to valid claims for GDR
citizens who obtained their property or usage rights through unfair
machinations. Such citizens have no legal recourse and their property
rights are invalid. 43 Another exception contained within the Decla-
ration states that property expropriated between May 8, 1945 and
October 6, 1949 will not be returned." The GDR and FRG reached
an impasse on this issue because the GDR maintained that it could
not restore property that the Soviet Union had expropriated during
that period, nor could records of the expropriations be procured. 45
The FRG took exception and held that only a united German leg-
islature could reach a definitive decision on such compensation. 46 The
Declaration was adopted in the Agreement Treaty and became the
law as to expropriated property.
In July of 1990 the GDR issued the Regulation of the Registration
of Claims to Property Rights ("Registration Regulation"), which
described the process by which claimants can assert their claims for
19 Id. at item 6.
,- Id. at item 9.
41 Id. at item 5.
42 Id. at item 13.
43 Id. at item 8.
" Id. at item 1.
" See Gemeinsame Erkiarung, supra note 36, at 7. See M. DENNIS, GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC at 129, for a description of the East German land reform
that began in 1945.
46 Handelsblatt, June 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3
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the restitution of expropriated property. 47 The Registration Regulation
enacted the items in the Joint Declaration into law and provided
some notable clarifications and exceptions. To recover expropriated
real property, property rights, chattels, enterprises, and bank account
holdings, claimants were required to submit their claims to the district
magistrate's office or city administration by January 31, 1991.4 Each
local administration examines all property sales that occurred within
the jurisidiction after October 18, 1989 to insure that the titles are
clear. 49 The Registration Regulation also contains a catalog of valid
and invalid claims.-° The valid claims include property expropriated
from citizens who left the GDR without a permit; property seized
by the state as foreign property; and property taken through the
misuse of power, corruption, deception, or coercion. 5' Examples of
invalid claims are all expropriations during the Soviet occupation
from May 8, 1945 through October 6, 1949; property expropriated
through the criminal process; foreign restitution claims that have
already been settled; and expropriated houses that were seized due
to excess indebtedness, lack of rent payments, waiver of ownership
rights, or donation into people's property. 52
B. Monetary, Economic, and Social Unification
The Treaty for the Creation of a Monetary, Economic, and Social
Unification between West and East Germany established the legal
basis for East Germany's transition from a planned socialist economy
to that of a social market economy.53 The Treaty guarantees the right
to private ownership54 and economic freedom," and further guarantees
that the GDR's economic and fiscal policies are in harmony with the
social market economy.5 6 In principle, the Treaty altered all GDR
,7 Von Seldenbeck, Verordnung uber die Anmeldung vermogensrechtlicher An-
spriiche, DDR SPEZIA, July 20, 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Von Seldenbeck, Anmel-
dungsverordnung] (explaining the Verordnung uber die Anmeldung
verm6gensrechtlicher Anspruiche, July 15, 1990 (E. Ger.)).
Handelsblatt, July 31, 1990, at 6, col. 6 (explaining the Verordnung fiber die
Anmeldung verm6gensrechtlicher Anspriche, July 15, 1990 (E. Ger.)).
"9Id.
10 Von Seldeneck, Anmeldungsverordnung, supra note 47, at 7.
51 Handelsblatt, July 31, 1990, at 6, col. 6 (explaining the Anmeldungsverordnung).
52 Id.
53 The Treaty, supra note 25, at preamble.
14 Id. at art. 2(1).
55 Id. at art. 3.
56 Id. at art. 11(1).
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laws that were not in accord with the FRG's Basic Law, including
previous laws that forbade the private acquisition of people's property. 7
Supplement Nine to the Treaty emphasizes that the GDR policy
proscribing the private acquisition of people's property seriously im-
pedes investment opportunities." The GDR agreed to repeal all laws
which prevented the acquisition of real property. 59 The GDR instituted
several measures to further this goal. Specifically, it agreed to provide
real estate for business purposes, especially in the cities, by making
usage rights available. The GDR also assured the cooperation of the
municipal administrations in the development of a real estate market. 60
Finally, the GDR requires transforming enterprises to appraise their
property and, following privatization, permits such enterprises to
utilize the former people's property as security for credit. 6' Beyond
these general statements, Supplement Nine did not further clarify the
details of the privatization process.
C. The Trust Law
The Law for the Privatization and Reorganization of People's
Property ("Trust Law") 2 took effect on July 1, 1990 and recognized
guaranties of private ownership and economic freedoms in the Treaty
between the FRG and GDR.63 The Trust Law also created the Trust
Institution, a system of holding corporations designed to act in a
proprietary role over the people's enterprises and real property during
the transformation phase."4
The purpose of the Trust Law, as stated in the preamble, is to
privatize people's property as quickly as possible; make real property
available for business purposes; establish the competitiveness of as
I d. at art. 2(2). Supplement II and III Wirtschaftsunion Nos. 3, 4, & 5 state
that the FRG Trade Law and Corporate Laws (GmbH and AG Gesetze) are in
effect, but the Trust Law creates exceptions to these laws. Handelsblatt, July 10,
1990, at 6, col. 1. See Handelsblatt, June 12, 1990, at 3, col. 4.




62 Trust Law, supra note 29, at 300.
63 Reblin, Treuhandgesetz der DDR, DDR SpEzUL June 29, 1990, at 3. Compare
with Turner, Der Eigentumsbegriff, supra note 6, at 555. Under the prior regime,
all property in the GDR had to serve the material and cultural interests of the state.
See VEPR. art. 12 (E. Ger.), which states that private ownership of people's property
is forbidden and any usage rights must serve the interests and increse the social
wealth.
" Trust Law, supra note 29, at art. 2.
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many small and middle-sized enterprises as possible; secure and create
new jobs; ascertain the financial status of people's enterprises; and
assess the profitability of enterprises and their ability to adapt to a
social market economy. 65 The Trust Institution, whose powers were
significantly increased under the Trust Law, is an institution of public
law under the supervision of the East German Prime Minister."6 Its
charter is authorized by the legislature, and its rules of procedure
require the confirmation of the Council of Ministers. 67
The Trust Institution assumed proprietorship over all people's prop-
erty that had begun transformation under earlier legislation, 68 and
on July 1, 1990, automatically gained proprietorship over people's
property which had not yet begun transformation. 69 However, separate
provisions in the Trust Law dealt with property under the admin-
istration of the state or municipalities that exercised a governmental
function such as the mail service, railway, administration of waterways
and public highways, enterprises that were registered as bankrupt, 70
and agricultural and forestry enterprises. The separate provisions
allow these governmental enterprises to maintain their economic,
ecological, structural, and legal features. 7' Once the people's enter-
prises entered the Trust Institution, the Institution had until September
1, 1990 to place them under the supervision of Trust Corporations,
holding companies that are responsible for the actual restructuring
of the people's enterprises. 72 The people's combinations (Kombinate)
would then be designated as "corporations (Aktiengesellschaften)
under construction" and the people's businesses designated as "lim-
ited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschrainkter Haftung)
under construction. 71 3 During the construction phase the Trust In-
stitution sells shares or interests in the enterprises, establishing their
efficiency and competitiveness, liquidating unreconstructable enter-
prises or portions of enterprises, and decentralizing the people's com-
binations. This allows the reconstructable portions of the combinations
65 Id. at preamble; Id. at art. 11.
" Id. at art. 1 (2).
61 Id. at art. 1 (3).
Beschluss vom 1. Marz 1990 zur Griindung der Anstalt zur treuhanderischen
Verwaltung des Volkseigentums BGBI. I, Nr. 14, S. 107 (E. Ger.).
6 Trust Law, supra note 29, at art. 11 (2).
70 Id. at art. 1 (5).
71 Id. at art. 1 (6).
72 Id. at art. 6.
11 Id. at art. 14.
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to become independent competitive economic units, and enables the
unprofitable portions to be liquidated. 74 Within this framework the
Trust Institution may use all available market measures to establish
the enterprises on a financially sound basis, including raising credit,
issuing bonds, and selling portions or interests of the enterprises.75
The Trust Law places no restrictions on who may purchase the
interests.
The enterprises under construction were required to submit the
following to the Trust Institution by October 31, 1990: a draft of
the shareholders' agreement for limited liability companies, or a draft
of the charter for corporations; the closing balance from June 30,
1990; the opening balance from July 1, 1990; a financial statement;
a status report; and the specifications of real property owned by the
enterprises. 76 The boards of directors of the transforming enterprises
have until June 30, 1991, to submit the following to the commercial
register: the shareholders' agreement or charter, the opening balance,
financial statement, and an auditor's report." When this submission
has occurred, the entry "under construction" will be deleted from
the commercial register, and the firms will be considered fully pri-
vatized. If these measures have not taken place by June 30, 1991,
the enterprises will be liquidated or declared bankrupt .78
III. PROPERTY ANALYSIS
Although the Treaty between the FRG and the GDR furnishes the
means for the conversion of people's property to private property,
it leaves legal matters concerning the sale of people's property un-
clarified. 79 Discrepancies and gaps in these areas of the law constitute
the greatest impediments to investment in the GDR,80 ultimately slow-
ing privatization."' While the Regulation of the Registration of Claims
71 Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage lautet: Auf welche Weise kann man Betriebe
aus der Treuhand heraus 16sen?, Handelsblatt, June 18, 1990, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter
Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage]. See Trust Law, supra note 29, at art. 2 (6).
" Trust Law, supra note 29, at arts. 2 (7), 8, 9 (4).
76 Id. at art. 20.
7 Id. at art. 21.
71 Id. at art. 22.
1 Scholz, Der Staatsvertrag zur Wdhrungs-, Wirtschafts-und Sozialunion, 1990
BETRIEBs-BE ATER (Beilage 23 zu Heft 18) 1, 5.
80 Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 1. Kiefer, East Germany Finds Few
Investors So Far, CmusmTN Sci. MON IOR, Sept. 18, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
11 See Drost, Ungeklirte Eigentumsrechte 16sen Investitionsstau aus, Handelsblatt,
July 26, 1990, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Drost, Ungeklirte Eigentumsrechte].
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to Property Rights explains the process for registering claims, it does
not clarify how and when this process will take place. There are also
unanswered questions as to which claims are valid . 2 Uncertainties in
the law regarding land sales and restitution of expropriated property
deter potential investors, business partners, and lenders.83 For those
who seek to purchase property there is reason to be cautious.4 A
future court or commission may declare land purchases invalid if the
titles are unclear, or award property which is purchased to previous
owners whose claims for restitution take priority.83
A. Property Sales
A discrepancy in the law between the Joint Declaration for the
Regulation of Open Property Questions and the Law for the Sale of
People's Structures created an obstacle to the acquisition of property
in the GDR.8 6 The Joint Declaration, which, with exceptions, became
law with the enactment of the Registration of Claims to Property
Rights, stated that the GDR will only allow the sale of property or
structures when the prior owners affirm that they will not register
claims against the purchasers.Y However, some West German lawyers
contend that the Regulation of the Registration of Claims is in conflict
with the Sale of People's Property Law, which states in article one
that people's structures may be sold to private parties for business
purposes.88 The lawyers argue that in practice the Sales Law takes
precedence over the Regulation because the government did not intend
to halt the legal sale of land and therefore the sales should not be
impeded.89
The Federal Justice Administration's spokesman conceded that the
legal situation is unclear, and confirmed that despite the Justice
Administration's efforts to deter property sales with unclear titles,
purchasers are buying land and buildings through unauthorized meth-
82 Von Seldneck, Anmeldungsverordnung, supra note 47, at 7.
83 Id. at 1.
', Handelsblatt, July 26, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
83 Kittke, Eigentumserwerb an Grund und Boden in der DDR, DDR SPEZAL,
June 1, 1990, at 3, 4. According to the executive committee of the Trust Institution,
9500 applications for the restitution of businesses that were seized in 1972 have been
submitted. Handelsblatt, Aug. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
" Handelsblatt, July 26, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
Handelsblatt, July 31, 1990, at 6, col. 6 (explaining the Verordnung iber die
Anmeldung vermOgensrechtlicher Anspruiche from July 15, 1990 (E. Ger.)).
aId.
" Id. at 6, col. 7 (explaining the Anmeldungsverordnung).
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ods. 9° The Justice Administration maintains that the Regulation of
Claims Registration has priority over the earlier Law, and that all
sales of property with unclear titles must cease. The Justice Admin-
istration's spokesman stated on July 25, 1990, "we expect that interim
sales will be declared null and void." 9'
The GDR must provide a solution to this dilemma, and allow
investors to obtain ownership of the land and buildings they require
to conduct business. The GDR could solve the investment obstacle
by allowing the local magistrates92 to authorize land conveyances
when they believe in good faith that the title is clear. The government
could then establish a central fund to compensate victims of expro-
priation. 9 Such a solution could, however, be construed as a violation
of article 14 of the Basic Law.9
B. Restitution of Expropriated Property
Rather than establishing a lasting law that settled the expropriations
controversy in Germany, the Regulation of the Registration of Claims
to Property generated a storm of debate over which claims are legally
enforceable. 9 The catalog of valid and invalid claims drew seemingly
arbitrary distinctions between the Criteria of enforceable and unen-
forceable claims. 96
- According to GDR law, private parties may only obtain usage rights to people's
property. Von Seldeneck, Probleme beim Abschlub, DDR SPEZALU, June 20, 1990,
at 1 (citing ZGB art. 20, abs. 3 (E. Ger.)). Also, according to GDR law, Western
purchasers must acquire a permit from the district administration in five new German
states to purchase private property. As of March 3, 1990, the new state authorities
were not issuing the permits to Westerners. Many buyers have resorted to using
"strawmen," East Germans who purchase the property and hold the titles for the
buyers. Others have drawn up preliminary contracts with the owners which stipulate
that the purchaser can utilize the land and has a right to the title when the East
German is able to convey it. See Von Seldeneck, Probleme beim Abschlub, DDR
SPEZlAL, June 20, 1990, at 1.
91 Handelsblatt, July 26, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
It has been suggested that the transition to West German law and a social
market economy could be expedited and made more efficient by the placement of
West German officials and experts in key positions in the East German administration.
The administration of real property issues and the establishment of industries are
especially appropriate areas for this policy. Most East German officials lack the
necessary knowledge and qualifications to implement the required changes. Bading,
Schleppendes Angebot von Gewerbefldchen in der DDR fuhrt zu Zuruickhaltung bei
Investitionsentscheidungen, Handelsblatt, July 27, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
91 Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
Handelsblatt, July 29/30, 1990, at 3, col. 3. See GG art. 14 (W. Ger.).
', See Handelsblatt, Aug. 2, 1990, at 4, col. 5. See also Gemeinsame Erkiarung,
supra note 37, at 7.
" Gemeinsame Erkiarung, supra note 36, at 7.
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According to the Regulation, no property which was expropriated
before October 7, 1949 will be returned to the prior owners. 7 The
GDR's delegation to the meeting on the Joint Declaration for the
Regulation of Open Property Questions asserted that the reason for
this cutoff date was that the Soviet occupation of the GDR during
that period was responsible for those expropriations." The West
German representatives to the meeting disputed the assertion" by
pointing out that in 1945 the GDR, of its own accord, enacted the
land reform' 00 that expropriated over 2.5 million hectacres.10 1 The
representatives did not settle the dispute. The West German delegation
wanted a united German legislature to reach a decision regarding
that period, but the East Germans issued the Claims Regulation
despite West German protest.'02
After the GDR enacted the Regulation on July 15, 1990, an as-
sociation was formed to represent people whose property in the GDR
had been seized. 03 The association maintains that article 14 of the
Basic Law requires the GDR to provide for the return of expropriated
property that otherwise meets the criteria of the Regulation, 0 4 and
further contends that any agreement between the GDR and FRG that
did not include such a provision would be unconstitutional.' °5
The Claims Regulation also left approximately 68,000 citizens,
whose houses were expropriated between June 11, 1953 and November
13, 1989 due to excess debt or lack of rent payments, without legal
means of recovering their property. 0 6 The clause in the Joint Dec-
laration that provided compensation for these cases was not included
in the Claims Regulation.'0 The GDR government created an arbitrary
distinction in this case between people who left the GDR without
providing for their property and those who left their property in the
97 Handelsblatt, July 31, 1990, at 6, col. 6, (explaining the Anmeldungsverord-
nung).
98 See Gemeinsame Erkirung, supra note 36, at 7. See Handelsblatt, July 18,
1990, at 7, col. 3.
9 Handelsblatt, July 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3.
-® See Gemeinsame Erklirung, supra note 36, at 7.
10, M. DENNIS, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 129 (1988).
102 See Handelsblatt, July 18, 1990, at 7, col. 3.
103 Handelsblatt, July 29/30, 1990, at 3, col. 3.
104 Id. Article 14 requires the government to compensate owners for expropriated
property. GG art. 14 (W. Ger.).
Jos Id.
106 Handelsblatt, Aug. 2, 1990, at 4, col. 5.
107 Handelsblatt, July 30, 1990, at 6, col. 7.
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possession of another private party.'°8 The former emigrants had valid
claims and the latter did not. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) in
the FRG heavily critized the GDR for the lack of the clause in the
Regulation.109
Solving the property questions before German reunification took
place was practically impossible. The GDR sought to limit the res-
titution of expropriated property, while the FRG preferred to increase
the number of compensable claims. 10 The solution will require a
complex and discriminating system of laws to distinguish between
claims that warrant the return of property and claims that warrant
only compensation. The East German and West German legislatures,
separated by hundreds of kilometers and a border, could not agree
on the same set of laws.
Article 14 of the Basic Law necessitates that the united German
legislature compensate the victims of unjustified expropriation.' The
Agreement Treaty developed a system of compensation which would
award compensation from a central fund when the return of property
would cause a hardship for others. ' 2 Expropriations that took place
before October 7, 1949 will most likely not be compensated. Yet,
the 68,000 claimants that were not accounted for in the Claims
Regulation probably do have valid claims, as the Agreement Treaty
stipulated that Germany would enact no law which contravenes the
Joint Declaration." 3
IV. ANALYsis
A. The Trust Institution
The Trust Law accorded the Trust Institution reorganizational and
financial recovery functions that encompass almost the entire GDR
economy, which includes approximately 8000 enterprises and over six
million employees," 4 and created a special status for transforming
- Handelsblatt, Aug. 2, 1990, at 4, col. 5.
109 The chairman of the FDP, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, called the lack of the clause
an "unconstitutional limitation" and asked the West German government to hold
the GDR to the Joint Declaration and to supplement the Claims Regulation with
the missing clause. Id.
110 See id.
"I See GG art. 14 (W. Ger.).
112 See Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
" Agreement Treaty, supra note 28, at art. 41 (3).
"4 Strobel, Die staatsvertragliche Umstellung des DDR-Rechnungswesens und die
Neuerungen des DDR-Trehangesetzes, 1990 BETRIEBS-BERATER (Beilage 23 zu Heft
18) 17, 26 [hereinafter Strobel, Die Umstellung].
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enterprises due to the unusual circumstances and requirements in-
volved in transforming socialist property into private property." 5
Three noteworthy obstacles to privatization are inherent in this tem-
porary state of the enterprises under the Trust Institution. The first
obstacle concerns the financial statements which the enterprises must
submit to the commercial register to become fully privatized.1 6 The
second obstacle regards the difficulties involved with the decentral-
ization of the people's businesses."17 The last issue relates to the Trust
Institution's methods utilized in privatizing the enterprises.' 8
The fiduciary status of an enterprise under the Trust Law created
an exception to the West German Trade Law (Handelsgesetzbuch),
which also took effect in East Germany on July 1, 1990 as part of
the Treaty. ' 9 The Trade Law requires that a corporation or company's
financial status be publicized and authorized by a notary public before
the corporation can be entered in the commercial register.12° GDR
enterprises in transformation are able to avoid registering with the
commercial register by submitting their financial information, in-
cluding opening balances,' 2' directly to the Trust Institute,122 rather
than to the commercial register. Many enterprises probably were not
able to meet the October 31, 1990 registration deadline due to the
complexities surrounding the submission of financial statements'2 3 and
- See Kelm, Das Treuhandgesetz der DDR schafft ein fragwardiges zeitweiliges
Sonderrecht, Handelsblatt, July 10, 1990, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter Kelm, Fragwulrdiges
Sonderrecht].
116 See Handelsblatt, July 27, 1990, at 15, col. 5. See Reblin, Treuhandgesetz der
DDR, DDR SPEZIAL, June 29, 1990, at 3, 4.
1,7 See Schum, Marktwirtschaft von oben ist in keinem Fall ein hilfreiches Rezept,
Handelsblatt, July 27, 1990, at Dl, col. 1.
-' See Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage, supra note 74, at 6, col. 1.
",9 Books I-III of the Trade Law became effective in the GDR on July 1, 1990,
as part of the Treaty. The Treaty, supra note 25, at 553. See Kelm, Fragwuirdiges
Sonderrecht, supra note 115, at 6, col. 1.
120 HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] sec. 10 (W. Ger.). A notary public must accurately
and thoroughly examine a firm's assets before it enters the commercial register. See
Kelm, Fragwiirdiges Sonderrecht, supra note 115, at 6, col. 1.
12, The opening balance must be an appraisal of the company's total worth in
West German deutsch marks. According to the GDR's Statistics Office, the GDR
requires a great deal of assistance from the FRG in this area due to a lack of
accounting know-how. See Handelsblatt, Jan. 22, 1991, at 12, col. 1; see also
Handelsblatt, Jan. 22, 1991, at 12, col. 1.
122 Trust Law, supra note 29, at art. 20.
23 Handelsblatt, July 27, 1990, at 15, col. 5; see Kelm, Fragwiirdiges Sonderrecht,
supra note 115, at 6, col. 1.
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the rendering of accounts to meet West Germany standards.'2
After the financial information has been submitted to the Trust
Institution, the enterprises have until June 30, 1991 to submit the
financial information to the commercial register. Until the financial
documents from each enterprise are authorized by the commerical
register, the actual financial status of each enterprise will remain
unclear, since many financial statements are likely to be inaccurate. 25
Hence, the Trust Law created a questionable status for the trans-
forming firms that allows them to keep inadequate financial records
while they remain "under construction." Some enterprises will likely
utilize the opportunity to make their records more attractive to banks
and investors by overstating their assets in the opening balance' 2 and
underestimating their debt.' 2 Upon reunification, however, the West
German Trade Law took precedence over the Trust Law' 28 and re-
quires an enterprise to submit the financial information to the com-
mercial register for authorization upon privatization.
Once a firm submits its information, the register judges face the
momentous task of quickly processing thousands of financial doc-
uments. Investors, creditors, and possible business partners of en-
terprises "under construction" must do without the evidentiary
advantage of the commercial register and must rely instead on their
own investigations. 29 After reunification the register judges will have
the responsibility of accurately checking the newly privatized firms'
financial status so that public trust in the commercial register may
be maintained. 30
Possibly the Trust Institute's most difficult function is decentral-
izing the conglomerations of firms within the monopolistic structure
of the people's combinations and developing small and middle-sized
124 Luckey, Neubeginn in der Rechnungslegung, Handelsblatt, July 6/7, 1990, at D2,
col. 3 [hereinafter Luckey, Neubeginnl.
'1 Juirgen Siedler, a West German member of the directorate of the Henkel KGaA
(partnership limited by shares), which is taking over the Genthin GmbH, a transforming
enterprise under the Trust Institution, recently stated: "One cannot always ask questions
and wait until the questions are answered. By that time the East German businesses
will be bankrupt. You have to take risks." The East German firm had not submitted
an opening balance. Handelsblatt, Aug. 2, 1990, at 14, col. 1.
'1 Luckey, Neubeginn, supra note 124, at D2.
I" See Handelsblatt, July 30, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
I See Handelsblatt, July 23, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
129 See Handelsblatt, July 30, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
130 See Kelm, Fragwirdiges Sonderrecht, supra note 115, at 6, col. 1.
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firms from the different departments.' 3 ' Since the goal of the Trust
Institution is the privatization of the people's property, only firms
or portions of combinations that have a possibility of survival in the
market should receive credit from the Trust Institution.3 2 Enterprises
which have no chance of survival must either be liquidated or declared
bankrupt.'33 Property which is not capable of privatization but per-
forms a government or social function may be conveyed to municipal
or city governments. 34 The market should also determine which en-
terprises obtain credit from outside the Trust Institution, offers for
joint ventures, and other forms of assistance. When an enterprise
cannot acquire enough proceeds to cover its expenses through its own
production, services, or through investments from other sources, it
should be reorganized much like under American chapter 11 law. 33
Unfortunately the Trust Institution has initiated the "watering can
principle" of funding the transforming enterprises, whereby the Trust
Institution directly gives each enterprise 41% of its credit require-
ment. 3 6 One resultant problem is that some firms overestimate their
financial need and thereby take away funding from firms that ac-
curately assess their credit requirements. A second undesirable con-
sequence is that the "watering can principle" unnecessarily adds to
the life of firms that cannot survive and does not provide enough
support to the firms that could survive if they had adequate credit. 37
The Trust Institution should develop a fair system to rate the firms'
possibilities of survival and provide credit on a case by case basis
pursuant to the findings of a committee of financial experts.
Also, risks involving the decentralization of GDR enterprises through
the Trust Institution exist. The Trust Institution may not completely
decentralize the combinations and, instead, will sell considerable por-
tions to individual Western firms enabling portions of the combi-
nations to continue operating as a unit. Thus, the Trust Institution
may defeat a purpose of the Trust Law as stated in its preamble. 3
,3, See Handelsblatt, July 24, 1990, at 4, col. 3.
132 See Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage, supra note 74, at 6, col. 1.
3 Joachim & Zeiner, Was nicht privatiierungsfzhig ist, das ist auch nicht sani-
erungsfahig, Handelsblatt, Jan. 14, 1991, at 15, col. 1 [hereinafter Joachim & Zeiner,
Privatisierungsfdhig].
"4 Trust Law, supra note 29, at art. 1 (1).
,3 See Siebert, Die Entscheidende Frage, supra note 74, at 6, col. 4.
"4 See Handelsblatt, July 30, 1990, at 13, col. 4.
137 Id.
13 Schum, Marktwirtschoft von oben ist in keinem Fall ein hilfreiches Rezept, Han-
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Evidence supports the assertion that the Trust Institution is selling
large portions of combinations and entire firms to individual parties
for the sake of expediency. 3 9 All the purposes of the Trust Institution
must be considered during the transformation. A better choice, how-
ever, is furthering privatization at the expense of less decentralization.
East German firms under the Trust Institution lack Western entre-
preneurial expertise. In many cases, East German firms' survival
depends on whether they receive timely and competent advice in their
undertakings and administration. The Trust Institution is overbur-
dened and cannot meet the management needs of all the firms under
its authority.140 For that reason, it is preferable to sell some firms
in their entirety to Western investors rather than allowing them to
go bankrupt due to their own mismanagement.
Another crucial question is by which method will all the firms be
taken out of the Trust Institution. The firms that are financially
healthy and capable of independent privatization can sell shares of
the enterprise or receive credit secured by the firms' assets to finance
the process.' 4' However, the majority of the enterprises are incapable
of procuring the necessary investment and liquid capital due to their
lack of accurate financial statements and due to the uncertainty in
the ownership of their real property. 42 The poor financial condition
of many firms also limits the possibility of management buy outs. 43
In such cases, the Trust Institution performs the essential function
of finding purchasers for transforming enterprises. When possible,
the Trust Institution seeks multiple applicants in order to establish
a market and market price for the enterprises by conducting auc-
tions.'1" The bulk of new investment presently goes to enterprises in
the service sector. 45
delsblatt, July 27, 1990, at Dl, col. 1. The preamble to the Trust Law states that a
duty of the Trust Institution is to create as many small and middle-sized firms as
possible. See Trust Law, supra note 29, at preamble.
,19 See Handelsblatt, Aug. 1, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
,40 See Ziener, Die Wirtschaft diktiert das Geschehen, Handelsblatt, Aug. 6, 1990,
at 2, col. 3.
141 Fockenbrock, Hochzeitskandidaten werden immer seltener, Handelsblatt, Jan. 14,
1991, at 15, col. 1. Previously the Trust Institution underestimated the number of
enterprises which could survive without privatization. Helmuth Coqui, director of the
Berlin branch of the Trust Institution, questions the principle of privatization as an
end in itself. He maintains that privatization is urgently required only for the problem
cases. Id.
142 Kiefer, East Germany Finds Few Investors So Far, CmRisTn Sc. MoNrroR, Sept.
18, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
143 Joachim & Zeiner, PrivatisierungsfAhig, supra note 133, at 15.
I" Id.
145 Liebfritz, Economic Consequences of German Unification, Busu;ss EcoNoMcs
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The Trust Director stated in January 1991 that the marketing of
the enterprises will enter the active phase only after establishment of
a large number of sales teams and an information system to permit
greater insight into and management of the workings of the priva-
tization process. The production of business catalogs oriented towards
foreigners will faciliate these sales. 14
The risk exists that the Institution will perpetuate itself and in the
process will lose its original purpose-the privatization of people's
property. This can be prevented by legally limiting the Institution's
duration. Additionally, the Institution must remain separated from
the political process, much like the West German Federal Reserve
(Bundesbank).147 Furthermore, the best protection against the Trust
Institution becoming a government holding and degenerating into an
investment control center is the legal establishment of the right of
businesses to become privatized through the Trust Law.'4
V. CONCLUSION
After the East Germans revolted in the Fall of 1989 and voted to
rejoin West Germany, the unification of two completely different
systems of property ownership confronted them. East Germany pos-
sessed a planned socialist economy in which the government controlled
90% of all businesses as socialist property. In the spring of 1990,
East Germany began the process of privatizing its socialist property
by enacting regulations to allow Western firms to invest in and
purchase East German firms. Issuance of the early regulations was
vol. 7, no. 4. This includes retail sales outlets, tourism industries, restaurants, and
banking and insurance services. Id. The value of service industries is more ascertainable
than the value of other enterprises, such as the parts of the decentralized combinations
which require valuations and can often be sold only for their net assets value. Joachim
& Zeiner, Privatiierungdhig, supra note 133, at 15.
146 Joachim & Zeiner, Privatisierungfihig, supra note 133, at 15.
141 See Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage, supra note 74, at 6, col. 2. The German
National Bank is one of the most independent central banks in any of the industrial
nations. It is independent of government instructions or directives and can advise
the federal government on monetary matters of importance. Government officials
can attend the deliberations of the Central Bank Committee, but they have no vote
and their power is limited to the ability to delay decisions by up to two weeks. See
P. KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLMCS IN WEST GEl.MmANY 84, 86 (1987).
,,' When a firm makes a reasonable offer to purchase an enterprise within the
Trust Institution, the Institution has two months to examine the offer and compare
it to any other offers for the enterprise. After the Institution's publication and
examination of the offer, the transforming enterprise has a firmly established right
to become privatized. Siebert, Die entscheidende Frage, supra note 74, at 6, col. 2.
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in an ad hoc manner, intended to serve as only temporary measures
until East Germany and West Germany could reunite.
East and West Germany issued the Joint Declaration for the Reg-
ulation of Open Property Questions on June 15, 1990, which provided
for the return of property which had been expropriated by the East
German government after 1949. The Joint Declaration also halted
the legal sale of previously expropriated property. As a follow up to
the Joint Declaration, East Germany enacted the Regulation of the
Registration of Claims to Property Rights. This did not include some
of the compensable categories included by the Joint Declaration. As
a result, the validity of approximately 68,000 claims was doubtful.
The Agreement Treaty between East and West Germany resolved this
ambiguity by adopting the Joint Declaration as the governing law.
The Treaty for the Creation of a Monetary, Economic, and Social
Unification of West and East Germany established the legal basis for
East Germany's transition to a social market economy on July 1,
1990. In principle, the Treaty replaced all East German laws that
were not in accord with a social market economy with West German
law. Accompanying the Treaty was the Trust Law, which created the
means for privatizing East Germany's socialist enterprises through
the Trust Institution. The Trust Institution is a system of holding
corporations designed to provide credit and find buyers for East
German firms under transformation.
The Trust Law also created some exceptions to West German trade
law which East Germany implemented. The firms under the Trust
Institution are not required to maintain accurate records until they
actually become privatized. This process may last up to one year. In
the intervening time, investors must be skeptical of the firms' financial
records and conduct their own investigations. German economists
also fear that the Trust Institution will not fully decentralize the
socialist businesses and, instead, will sell portions of large firms to
Western firms thereby creating monopolies.
Only the unified legislature of East and West Germany will be able
to formulate a workable solution to the problems of the restitution
of expropriated property. In many cases, the right to restitution will
be sacrificed in favor of compensation. East and West Germans will
find it easier to resolve their difficulties in a unified parliament.
However, the uncertainties involved in the issues of restitution and
return of expropriated property are still the greatest obstacles to
investment and privatization in the five new states of Germany.
Michael J. Thomerson
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